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Johnson: Toronto Scottish Machine Gun Battalion in Normandy

as given by Colonel Johnson,
Commanding Officer to Captain Engler
near Bourgtheroulde, 29 August 1944

T

he battalion's activities in NORMANDY do not
reveal any new techniques or u n u s u a l
procedures or expound any new doctrine. Their
main result is to vindicate in action the teachings
from instructors and from pamphlets used in
England.

The battalion contains three medium
machine gun companies each with three platoons,
each containing four medium machine guns. The
characteristics of this weapon are a long narrow
beaten zone and the ability to fire indirectly as
well as directly over considerable ranges.
Carriers add a certain additional mobility but
the machine guns and their ammunition must
be m a n h a n d l e d when required. In their
employment it must be remembered that they
are not suited to close country and when they
are u s e d in a r e a s of this sort a careful
reconnaissance is required so that they may be
placed in the most advantageous position. For
this, a good plan is essential so that the long
enfilade fire may be made use of interlocking over
a wide front. If this is to be done quickly, it should
be done at a reasonably high level where liaison
is not required between units. It is also wise to
use these weapons to secure a volume of fire
where their long range and narrow beaten zone
can be employed most effectively rather than to
disperse them and thus be forced to use many of
them in less advantageous positions. For this
reason the brigade commanders should consider
terrain carefully and he prepared to retain the
machine guns as a brigade reserve or to allot
them entirely to one battalion if necessary.
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An alternative to this h a s occasionally
occurred where brigades have sub-allotted their
company with one platoon to each battalion,
presumably for the sake of fairness. The battalion
commander has been, of course, glad to receive
any additional weapons to assist him in his
operations and has accepted them whether they
were really able to be used efficiently or not. In
turn, battalion commanders have been tempted
to sub-allot them with one gun per coy or more
often to place them far forward where he has
naturally been most concerned with protection.
The company commander, thus saddled with
machine guns where no proper fields of fire are
available, has tended again to place them with
his most exposed platoons where they have
performed the functions of. local defence alone.
Thus, a zone of medium machine gun fire
covering the divisional front or its most exposed
areas, has been converted into a series of isolated
medium machine gun positions not mutually
supporting, and with poor fields of fire. The guns
themselves have been sited far forward where
they have been needlessly exposed without
performing a justifiably effective role. In the
advance the medium machine guns have two
functions to perform. They can support the
infantry with fire before their attack and during
its early stages can cover enemy positions with
effective fire. Then their role appears to be to
wait until the infantry have consolidated on their
objective and then to come forward and be
positioned in r e a d i n e s s for a deliberate
counterattack. Only thus is it possible for proper
reconnaissance to be made in order to place the
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Above & right: Bren Gun Carriers of the Toronto
Scottish Carrier Platoon ready to move into
action near Tilly-la-Campagne, France, 8 August
1944.
weapons on the ground with proper fields of fire
and proper support and protection. The
alternative is to bring the medium machine g u n s
forward earlier where they have to be positioned
often in the dark without any real reconnaissance
a n d w h e r e t h e y t h u s c a n n o t perform.their
function effectively. The practice h a s occasionally
occurred of placing medium machine g u n s in "F"
Echelon well forward even w h e n there h a s been
no p l a n d r a w n up for their immediate use. T h u s
they have h a d t o s t a n d mortaring a n d shelling
casualties needlessly and often have been brought
forward into d a n g e r o u s areas only to wait while
hurried a n d incomplete reconnaissance h a s been
m a d e for their positions.
The defensive battle permits time for placing
these weapons very carefully and for digging them
in with great care. The thing requiring attention
t h a t their DF a n d DFSOS t a s k s be interlocked
with artillery a n d m o r t a r p l a n s , having regard
for their characteristics.
The battle at VERSON provides an excellent
example of the u s e of m a c h i n e g u n s in defence.
Here the m a c h i n e g u n s fired at extreme range

and were carefully given tasks which fitted in with
those given to the artillery a n d the m o r t a r s . All
these tasks appeared on a single trace a n d during
the holding of the line from 11 to 19 J u l y t h e
machine guns fired very often a n d very effectively.
During the advance the m a c h i n e g u n s have
b e e n u s e d for effective fire to protect the flanks
particularly during the advance SOUTH to cover
t h e river a t S T ANDRE-SUR-ORNE a n d a t
BRETTEVILLE-SUR-LAIZE. During the advance
on the night 7 / 8 A u g u s t 1 platoon c o m m a n d e r
57
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Above: Canadian soldiers train with the Vickers
Medium Machine Gun in England, April 1944.
Left: Sergeant Ben Landriault of the Toronto Scottish
Carrier Platoon, Normandy France, August 1944.

The experiences so far indicate that the
machine guns should not be used when the
country does not permit giving them proper fields
of fire. They should be used on as high a level as
the situation permits and care should be taken
in timings so that they are not brought forward
until they are required and until adequate
preparations have been made for placing them.

paid dearly br forgetting the rules of the textbook
in the area SOUTH of ROCQUANCOURT. He
there brought forward his platoon without
making an adequate reconnaissance and without
having them dismount at a suitable distance in
rear of the enemy. Instead they came straight
forward in their vehicles to an orchard near the
airport and suffered heavy casualties when they
ran into an enemy tank.

The mortar company, with its four platoons
and four mortars per platoons has proved an
efficient and valuable weapon. Its chief lack is
range. At present it is outranged by enemy
mortars and thus is ineffective in a great deal of
counter mortar work. Its characteristics include
a wide beaten zone, 150 x 250 yards. Because of
its very wide beaten zone and because of its value
in bringing down devastating fires it should be
used in concentrations on the targets most suited
to it rather than be dispersed and have its
effectiveness frittered away in penny packets.
Again the moral seems to be to make use of it on
the highest possible level.
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